PRINCIPLES IN PRACTICE: "UNSTUCK" OR STICKY?
FRANK GOODMAN
In response to jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles,Practices, and
Social Movements, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 927 (2006).
In previous writings, Professors Balkin and Siegel (the authors),
both together and separately, have made major contributions to the
scholarly literatures on constitutional doctrine and on social movement activism. Their recent essay, Principles, Practices, and Social Movements,' attempts to bridge the two fields at a high level of abstraction,
albeit with useful examples. The bridge is an elegant structure, but
not without flaws. It is a valuable project that will provide a point of
departure for future scholars who may wish to cross the same divide.
I.

OVERVIEW OF THE BALKIN-SIEGEL POSITION

The authors introduce us to "two current controversies in American law and politics ... [:1 whether the expansion of copyright...
conflicts with the free speech principle ...[and] whether governmental collection and use of racial data violates the antidiscrimination
principle. 2 Both controversies involve the claimed "application of a
longstanding principle to a longstanding practice-a practice that
heretofore has not been understood to be implicated by the principle.",3 Such a claim "draws into question not only the legitimacy of the
practice, but also the authority and scope of the principle. 4 Thus,
"[w] hile some argue that the free speech principle delegitimates expansion of copyright terms... , others insist that the challenged practice is fully consistent with the free speech principle . . . ." Hence this
question:
Does the free speech principle call into question copyright or does
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copyright raise disturbing questions about the scope and meaning of the
free speech principle? ... [The] Essay is about the ways that principles
and practices can draw each other's authority into question, and about
the role that political contestation plays in spurring those challenges .... A principle always comes with an imagined regulatory scene
that makes the meaning of the principle coherent to us. When that
background understanding is disturbed the principle becomes "unstuck"
from its hermeneutic moorings; it no longer seems clear how the principle applies or even whether it should apply.6

II.

PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES

The authors repeatedly describe the "unsticking" situation as one
in which the contending practices and principles are "longstanding."
But why must they be longstanding? True, a long and widely accepted
practice usually enjoys a strong presumption of constitutionality,
therefore has a leg up on any abstract principle that gets in its way,
and may require the trimming of that principle to make room for it.
(This may indeed be what has happened in the Copyright/First
Anendment situation, as we shall see.) On the other hand, a novel
practice, even without a presumption of validity, can present a new
and unexpected challenge to a principle that was not designed for it.
The authors briefly refer to three examples in which principles "once
uncontroversially accepted become counterintuitive... as they are
applied to new situations and problems": affirmative action, telecommunications regulation, and campaign finance reform.' All three examples involve novel, not longstanding, practices. The use of racial
preferences in university admissions was a recent innovation when it
was challenged in the Supreme Court" in the 1970s. The unprecedented "must-carry" provisions of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 19929 reached the Supreme Court '°
only two years after enactment. The Federal Election Campaign Act
of 1971," which was partially invalidated in Buckley v. Valeo, 2 had been
enacted only three years earlier. In all three instances, the questioned

G Id.at 928.
7 I. at 929-30.
8 SeeDe Funis v.Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (law school); Regents of the Univ.
of Cal. v.Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (medical school).
9 Pub. L. 102-385, § 4, 106 Stat. 1460, 1471-77 (codified as amended
at 47 U.S.C. §
534 (2006)).
10Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
11 Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (codified as amended at
2 U.S.C. §§ 431-55).
12 424 U.S. 1
(1976).
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practices were understood to be constitutionally problematic from the
beginning. Plainly, principles can be rendered problematic even, and
perhaps especially, by practices that are brand new.
For that matter, why must the principle itself be "longstanding?"
The privacy principle unveiled by the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut I-no
more than distantly related to any constitutional text or
precedent-was only eight years old when the Court extended it from
contraception to abortion. Once again, then, why did the authors
confine their "model" to "longstanding" practices and principles?
Perhaps they wanted to make things as hard for themselves as possible-wanted to show that even in the situation least intuitively favorable to their thesis, where the compatibility between the particular
practice and particular principle seemed most unassailable-this understanding could still be "disturbed" by scene-shifting and social
movement pressures. Or perhaps they just wanted to talk about copyright and racial data-collection, and looked for the narrowest features
they had in common.
A central concept in the authors' model is the "regulatory
scene"-"the set of background understandings about the paradigmatic cases, practices, and areas of social life"'-in which a constitutional principle is originally forged, from which it derives its meaning,
and the disturbance of which disorients or "unsticks" the principle.
Thus, "[t] he regulatory scene for the no-content-discrimination principle is the practice of state censorship or repression of dissent. " '
The history of the free speech principle, however, is the history of its
expansion from this original regulatory scene to other forms of regulation, other subjects of discussion (e.g., literature or commerce),
other (e.g., nonverbal) modes of speech, and other (e.g., electronic)
media of communication. Are all of these extensions new and different "regulatory scenes?" Are any of them? If the former, then the unsticking of constitutional principles is not an intriguing exception but
a garden-variety feature of constitutional law. Balkin and Siegel appear to have in mind a much more limited set of cases, though their
limiting characteristics (other than "longstandingness") are not entirely clear.
My sense is that the most interesting situations are those in which
practice and principle are both grounded in and claim justification
from the same liberal value (free speech versus free speech, equality
versus equality), or in which one high-ranking liberal value is pitted
1 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
& Siegel, supra note 1, at 929.
1) Id. at 931.
14 Balkin
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against another (free speech versus equality). Nearly all of the examples mentioned by the authors-affirnative action, campaign finance
reform, "must-carry" cable regulation, and, I would add, the regulation of hate speech (pornography or university racial- or sex-speech
codes)-fit this pattern. (The only one that doesn't fit is racial datagathering, and even that one sometimes does). In these cases, application of the constitutional principle would not only carry it beyond
its traditionally justifying norms and values, but would actually turn
the principle against those norms and values (or others of equal statire).
III. THE COPYRIGHT EXAMPLE

The example on which the authors chiefly focus is the alleged
conflict between copyright practice and free speech principle. The
case that has, so far at least, been the key battleground for this controversy is Fidred v. Ashcrof," decided in 2003. At issue was the constitutionality of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998''
(CTEA), which lengthened the duration of copyrights from seventy to
ninety years both for future and existing copyrighted works, including
those about to fall into the public domain. The petitioners were individuals and businesses that relied on public domain speech for their
livelihood or creativity, including commercial book publishers, a nonprofit film-preservation group, a noncommercial Internet publisher
(Eldred), and other members of the "free culture" movement (sometimes also known as the anti-enclosure movement, the anti-copyright
movement, intellectual property restrictors, or digitalists). They were
represented by Lawrence Lessig, a leading light of the free culture
movement and a distinguished legal scholar. They sought a declaratory judgment that the statute violated both the Copyright Clause of
Article 118 (in that repeated retroactive extensions of the term were
functionally equivalent to a perpetual grant) and the First Amendment (in that the statute was a content-neutral restriction of speech
and, as such, was subject to intermediate scrutiny rather than the rational basis review that applied to the Copyright Clause claim).'

16537 U.S. 186 (2003).
Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§
302,
304 (2006)).
is See U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl. 8 (empowering Congress "[tCo promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Rights to their Writings and Discoveries").
19At one point, the authors say "[w]hen we move fiom prosecutions of anti-war
protesters to the constitutionality of ... injunctions for copyright infiingement, we do
17
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The Court, by a 7-2 vote, rejected both claims. Justice Ginsburg
20
wrote for the Court; no member of the majority wrote separately;

and Justices Stevens and Breyer wrote dissents, but neither endorsed
the petitioners' free-standing First Amendment claim. "' On the Copy-

not know whether these practices are discriminations on the basis of content to which
strict scrutiny might apply." Balkin & Siegel supra note 1, at 932. But it is clear that the
content-based/content-neutral distinction was not at issue in Eldred. Petitioners expressly conceded that the statute was content-neutral and entitled only to intermediate
(but still heightened) scrutiny. Eldied, 537 U.S. at 218 n.23. Judicial precedent and
the weight of scholarly opinion support that concession. See S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc.
v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 536 (1987) (finding that statute granting exclusive rights to use the word "Olympic" for commercial purposes is content-neutral);
Regan v. Time, Inc. 468 U.S. 641, 656 (1984) (holding that color and size limitations
on the publication of color reproductions of U.S. currency is a content-neutral restriction); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp.2d 294, 326-30 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (holding that the Digital Millenium Copyrights Act's prohibition on the distribution of software designed primarily to circumvent access or copying codes is contentneutral); see also Elin Chemerinsky, Balancing Copyight Protections and Freedom o/?
Speech: Why the Copyright Extension Act is I twclltitttildl, 36 LoY. L.A. L. REN. 83, 93-94
(2002) (distinguishing general copyright statutes fi-om hypothetical discipline-specific
copyright statutes and noting that the former are content-neutral); Neil Weinstock
Netanel, Locating Copyight Within the First Amendment Skin, 54 STAN. L. REN. 1, 47-54
(2001) (characterizing copyright as content-neutral).
But see Mark A. Lemley &
Eugene Volokh, Freedom o/'Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Prop~ery Cases, 48 DUKE
L.J. 147, 186 (1998) ("It's also incorrect to argue that intellectual property law is content-neutral and therefore should be subject to laxer rules.").
20 Lessig later declared himself mystified by the fact that the five conservative
Justices who, in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1994) and United Saltes v. Marrison,529
U.S. 598 (2000), voiced deep concern for the need to limit congressional power under
the Commerce Clause, seemed unconcerned about limiting congressional power under a neighboring Article I clause that contains express language of limitation. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW THE BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW

TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 218-20, 242-43 (2004).

The fact
that none of these five felt it necessary to explain themselves or for any other reason to
write separately was also troubling, implying either that they fully agreed with the majority opinion (an opinion frequently criticized in the law rexiews) or that any disagreements were too minor to warrant public aiing.
At least two members of the "silent five" revealed their thinking during oral argument. Justice O'Connor worried that, Congress having repeatedly extended copyright
fiom the very beginning of our history, Lessig's position risked disturbing these prior
extensions, or at the ver y least that of 1976. 1d. at 238. ChiefJustice Rehnquist's difficulty was more basic: that Lessig was asserting a "right to copy verbatim other people's
books." Id. at 240. Noi-, in retrospect, is there any mystery aboutJustice Scalia's vote,
since in Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S.Ct 2195, 2215 (2005), Scalia had supplied the decisive
fifth vote to uphold the application of the federal Controlled Substance Act (CSA) to
state-authorized use of marijuana for medical purposes. He distinguished Lopez and
Morrison on the ground that the statutes in those cases, unlike the CSA, were not integral parts of a comprehensive legislative scheme clearly within congressional Article I
power'. Copyright, of course, satisfied justice Scalia's position.
21 Justice Stevens did not speak to the First Amendment issue at all. Justice
Breyer
went no further than to say that the rationality of the congressional action should be
considered "in light of the expressive values underlying the Copyright Clause, related
as it is to the First Amendment," and that he would "look harder than does the major-
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right Clause issue, the Court, relying on text, history, and precedent,
and adopting a highly deferential stance, concluded that the CTEA
was a "rational exercise of the legislative authority conferred" by the
Clause. On the First Amendment issue, it rejected petitioners' "plea
for imposition of uncommonly strict scrutiny of a copyright scheme
23
that incorporates its speech protective purposes and safeguards,"
such as the "fair use" exception and the distinction between copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas. The Court
stressed the proxility in time of the Copyright Clause and the First
Amendment and inferred from this the Framers' view that "copyright's limited monopolies are compatible with free speech principles"
and (echoing language in a previous case) that "'copyright itself [was
intended] to be the engine of free expression.'"-24 It declared that the
First Amendment "bears less heavily when speakers assert the right to
make other people's speeches" but that "[t]o the extent such assertions raise First Amendment concerns, copyright's built-in
free speech
25
safeguards are generally adequate to address them. ,
Does Eldred exemplify the kind of controversy described in the
Balkin-Siegel model-a longstanding practice claimed to violate a
longstanding principle? Not exactly. Extension of the copyright term
for existing as well as future works was clearly a longstanding practice;
Congress had practiced S it26 on several occasions both in the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries, without constitutional challenge. But the
opposing constitutional principle-that the statute was separately subject to heightened scrutiny under an independently applicable First
Amendment-was anything but longstanding. The contrary proposition-that the First Amendment does not protect copying or other infringing uses of copyright material, that the Amendment does not
place external limits on copyright law, and that a law presumed or
held to be valid under the Copyright Clause need not run another and
more demanding gauntlet under the First Amendment-was far better grounded in precedent and, arguably, in history. The Copyright

it) at the statute's rationality"-though less hard than the Court had done in some
previous rational basis precedents. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 264, 245. He also took "into account the fact that the Constitution is a single document, that it contains both a Copyright Clause and a First Amendment, and that the two are related." Id. at 243.
22 ld.
at 204.
2 A,
ld.
at 219.
24 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219 (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v.Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)).
2 d.
L at 221.
26 Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436; Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 329,
Pub. L. No.
60-349, 35 Stat. 1075; Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541.
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Clause and the Amendment were almost contemporaneous, and the
first Copyright Act was already on the books when the Amendment
was ratified. Moreover, the two regimes coexisted for 180 years without a hint of conflict. Legal scholarship turned its attention to the issue in 1970, when a seminal article by Melville Nimmer explored the
relationship between the two regines and concluded that they were
generally compatible because of copyright law's internal safeguards,
which adequately (with rare exceptions) accommodated free speech
values. 2 Lower federal courts soon adopted the Niinier view, 8 and
the Supreme Court likewise embraced it, first in a brief 1977 footnote,2t) and later, more extensively, in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enterprises,which famously declared that "the Framers intended
copyright itself to be the engine of free expression," 30 and that the
idea/expression dichotomy had struck a "'definitional balance'"" between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act." Thus, by 1985,
the principle of compatibility, and of the non-applicability of the First
Amendment per se to copying, was no longer merely a tacit and untested assumption but the explicit doctrine of the Supreme Court.
The Nimmer/Harper& Row resolution was not merely (what the authors call) a "mediating" rule designed to preserve a longstanding
First Amendment principle without discarding existing copyright
practice. It was a reconciliation of two constitutional provisions of
equal antiquity whose de facto existence and assumed compatibility
predated any other understandings of the meaning of the First
Amendment. For the same reasons, the copyright/free speech interface was not a new "regulatory scene," different from some earlier setting in which the meaning of the First Amendment was originally
forged.
Balkin and Siegel concede that Nimmer's resolution "stabilized
the conflict between free speech and copyright for a time., 32 Their
argument is that this more-or-less-settled understanding was "disrupted" by the growth and commercialization of the Internet in the
1990s and the emergence of mobilized and countermobilized groups
seeking to protect and advance their respective interests in response

27 Melville B. Nimnmer, Does Copynighl Abridge the
First Amendmenl Guarantees ?/EFwe
Speech and Press? 17 UCLA L. RnV. 1180 (1970).
28 See, e.g., Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d

1184, 1188 (5th Cir. 1979); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc v. McDonald's
Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1171 n.16 (9th Cir. 1977).
2
Zacchini v.Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 577 n.13 (1977).
?10
471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
31 Id.at 556.
?Q Balkin & Siegel, supranote
1, at 935.
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to the new digital technology.33 In effect, the authors argue that the
emergence of the Internet and the social movement contestation that
churns around it has created a new "regulatory scene" in which the
application of the First Amendment to copyright has become newly
uncertain.
The authors do not explain how political contestation or effective
mobilization by the opponents of copyright extension will alter the
constitutional issue or its outcome. It is easy to see how ranped-up
political activism can lead to successful results in the legislative arena
and, beyond that, how it can increase the flow of constitutional litigation to the courts and ultimately to the Supreme Court. In the long
run, it can create a legion of citizens duly appreciative of the cultural
riches and interactive opportunities that digital technology makes
available to them and that expanded (or even unexpanded) copyright
restriction denies them. That legion may even include judges, their
families, or others to whom they listen. In the short term, however,
the constitutional bearing of social movement activity is not crystal
clear. The best answer is that digital technology makes possible far
more extensive use of expressive materials in the public domain than
was ever dreamed of before and thus increases, perhaps dramatically,
the costs to the public of prolonged extension of the copyright monopoly. Whether this alteration of the empirical cost-benefit balance
will be seen to have constitutional significance is difficult to predict.
At present, only Justice Breyer seems to regard either of the constitutional issues in Eldred as hinging on a cost-benefit balancing test.
A surprising feature of the case is how little was made of the technological point either by the petitioners or (no doubt in consequence)
by the Justices (with the exception of Breyer). Lessig's brief does not
make a special point of the impact of the statute on the new digital
media', of expression and, in an oral exchange with Justice Kennedy,
he disclaimed any such empirical argument. 5 The Ginsburg and Stevens opinions do not mention the new technology. In sum, Breyer
aside, the opinions and arguments in Eldred would not have been significantly different had the issues been presented in an infringement
suit where the sole infringer and the sole copyright owner were both
commercial book publishers. Whether they would have been differ-

Id. at 936.
Such a demonstration was made difficult by the procedural posture of the case,
a facial challenge to the statute with no trial record.
?1)Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (No.
0134

168).
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ent if the sole infringer had been a noncommercial Internet publisher
like Eldred himself is hard to say. Such a case might conceivably
squeeze within a liberal reading of the fair use exception, and that
might be the wave of the future. Eldred will stand as a strong precedent against self-standing First Amendment scrutiny but leaves the
door open a crack for liberalization of copyright's internal safeguards.
In this latter context, however, the burden of persuasion will rest
upon the would-be users of copyrighted material rather than upon the
government.

As of now, it must be said that the copyright/free speech interface
is not an illustration of how constitutional principles become unstuck
under the disruptive pressure of social movement activities. It is an
illustration of the resiliency-the "stickiness"-of established principles even iii the face of powerful advocacy, scholarly criticism, and
technological pressure. That, of course, may change as the free culture movement gains adherents and political momentum. Balkin and
S 36
Siegel predict that it will. They liken Eldred to Bowers v. Hardwick,
which in 1986 upheld Georgia's sodomy law only to be overruled seventeen years later in Lawrence v. Texas. 7 They suggest that Eldred was
decided in the early stages of the free culture movenmentjust as Bowers
was in the early years of the gay rights movement and that further
mobilization and contestation by the former movement may achieve
the same success it did for the latter.
There are, however, pertinent differences between the sodomy
and copyright situations. For one thing, Georgia's sodomy statute was
one of many such laws enacted by state legislatures long ago but still
on the books. Gay rights advocates could pick them off one by one,
leaving the Court to mop up the few remaining outliers, as it did in
Lawrence. In both sodomy cases, the Court took note of prevailing
public attitudes, measured by a head count of state statutes. Bowers
observed that all states still had sodomy laws a quarter-century earlier
and that twenty-four still had them;Ms Lawrence, going the other way,
pointed out that nearly half of those statutes had been repealed in the
intervening years and that none of the rest was enforced. 39 No such
metric of shifting public opinion will be available in the copyright
context, where Congress alone has the power to legislate.
The free culture movement might very well win victories in Congress, but these would not necessarily enhance the prospect of consti-

36478 U.S. 186 (1986).
?7 539 U.S. 558
(2003).
318
478 U.S. at 192-94.
?19339 U.S. at 573.
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tutional victory in the Supreme Court; indeed they might have the
opposite tendency. A possibility in point is a bill proposed by Lawrence Lessig immediately after Eldred and introduced in Congress a
few months later as the Public Domain Enhancement Act 0 (PDEA).
It would provide an initial copyright term of fifty years, renewable for
two additional ten-year terms on payment of a small fee. Still-valuable
copyrights would of course be renewed, while those no longer valuable would presumably be allowed to lapse. Since it is estimated that
98% of all copyrighted materials no longer have commercial value a
half century after their creation, enactment of the PDEA would regain
for the public domain much of the ground lost to it by the CTEA and
Eldred. But by reducing the adverse impact of copyright law on free
expression, the reform might weaken, not strengthen, the case for
free-standing First Amendment scrutiny. Indeed, the shortened initial
term might well come to be viewed as simply another "internal" safeguard for free expression.
A second difference between the sodomy and copyright issues is
the opposite-cutting way in which international legal norms bore
upon each. In both Lawrence and Eldred, the Court attached significance to those norms. Non-confornity to the European Convention
on Human Rights counted against the Texas sodomy statute, whereas
the need for conformity to the Berne Convention was a major justification for the CTEA. Given that the United States is a large net exporter of intellectual property, and that it aspires to leadership in the
international effort to prevent piracy, it arguably cannot afford to be
seen as less protective of copyright than its European counterparts.
This may be an ongoing obstacle to assaults upon further copyright
extension laws.
A more basic difference, perhaps, lies in the nature of the rights
being asserted. That a person should be made a criminal for his or
her private sexual choices is an idea whose time has long since passed
in this and other liberal societies. That a person should not be pernitted to make unauthorized use of someone else's work is an idea
whose time has not passed and may never pass.
It should be noted, once again, that even if the Court were persuaded that the built-in safeguards do not adequately protect free
speech values, its response would more likely be to broaden or supplenment those built-ins (either through statutory construction or
Copyright Clause interpretation) rather than to disturb the settled
understanding that the First Amendment, with its heightened levels of
40

H.R. 2601, 108th Cong. (2003).

36

UNIVE

ITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 155:26

PENNumbra

judicial scrutiny, does not operate as an independent and external
constraint on copyright. Whether this internal/external distinction
would matter in practice would depend on how much deference the
Court gave congressional judgments in the process of defining and
applying the newly liberalized standards.
IV. RACIAL DATA-COLLECTION
The authors' racial data-collection example is less persuasive than
the copyright one. That the use of racial categories in the census
would be held unconstitutional without regard to its intended or actual use is intuitively unlikely. Unlikely, too, is the prospect that a successful social movement could be mobilized in support of such an
outcome. The authors offer little of a concrete nature to combat
these intuitions: one failed district-court lawsuit in 200041 and a badly
beaten constitutional initiative in California (Proposition 54) seeking
to bar collection of race-related information for use in public education, contracting, or employment. 2 It is important to add that
whether or not the collection of racial data is deemed a "racial classification," its constitutional fate would depend heavily on the use to
which it was put. Collection of such data for the purpose of civil rights
enforcement would almost certainly survive whatever scrutiny it received, even if nominally "strict."
No more persuasive is the authors' suggestion that the reception
and use of a racial identification contained in a victim's description of
a perpetrator may be a racial classification subject to strict constitutional scrutiny. 43 Discussion of this issue has focused on the Second
Circuit's decision in Brown v. City of Oneonta,44 and in particular on the
controversial opinion of Judge Guido Calabresi, dissenting from the
court's denial of rehearing en banc.'' The point to be stressed is that

41 Morales v. Daley, 116 F. Stipp.2d 801, 820 (S.D.
Tex. 2000) (holding that census
questions asking for racial self-classification do not violate Equal Protection or First
Amendment rights).
42 See Balkin and Siegel, supra note 1, at 941-42. This initiative was sponsored
by
Ward Connerly, the indefatigable champion of colorblindness, who had earlier managed a successful initiative (Proposition 209) to bar racial affirmative action by state
agencies or Universities. Proposition 209 won handily (54% to 46%). Proposition 54,
on the other hand, was rejected by nearly two to one (64% to 36%). The California
citizens who had voted against Proposition 54 must have included many who voted in
favor of Proposition 209. They apparently realized the difference between a use of racial data of which they disapproved and the collection of data capable of being put to a
variety of uses, including some of which they did approve.

4A,
ld. at 944-45.
44 221 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2000).
4) 235 F.3d 769, 779 (2d Cir. 2000).
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Judge Calabresi did not say that the giving, receiving, or faithfully acting upon the witness's description should trigger strict scrutiny. His
more modest proposition was that strict scrutiny is triggered when the
police "ignore essentially everything but the racial part of a victim's
description, and, acting solely on that racial element, stop and question all members of that race they can get hold of, even those who
grossly fail to fit the victim's description[.]"

4

6

Even a constitutional

traditionalist could accept that view. A police officer's behavior in
casting his investigative net only over black people would be constitutionally suspicious even in the absence of any description by a witness;
scrupulous adherence to a witness's racial identification would ease
that suspicion; but selective deviation from the description, through
disregard of its nonracial elements, would make the officer's conduct
all the more suspicious, for it would strengthen the inference that he
was acting on a racial classification of his own rather than merely fobllowing a lead. The witness's identification, in short, is a relevant fact
in determining the constitutionality of the officer's behavior but is not
itself constitutionally central.
Indeed, it is doubtful that the witness identification problem is
properly viewed as a racial data problem at all. It has more in conmon with the sit-in cases of the early 1960s, in which ostensibly neutral
state trespass laws were enforced against black demonstrators who entered and refused to leave restaurants or lunch counters despite racially exclusive signs posted by the owners. There, as here, the issue
was whether state officers enforcing neutral state laws violated the
Equal Protection Clause by acting upon racial inputs supplied by private actors but acting on racial inputs supplied by private actors became constitutionally responsible for those inputs and thereby violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Supreme Court stopped short
of such a holding in the sit-in case. It would be even less inclined to
find constitutional wrongdoing here.

46 Id. at 781.

